Miranda's main areas of interest are in ethics, epistemology, and in those regions of feminist philosophy that concern social identity, power, and the authority of reason.
Miranda co-edited The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy with Jennifer Hornsby (2000); and she is co-author of Reading Ethics, written with Sam Guttenplan, an introductory textbook giving interactive commentaries on classic texts in moral philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).
Her book, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007), explores how relations of social power and identity impinge in our epistemic practices to produce distinctively epistemic forms of injustice—injustices in which someone is undermined specifically in their capacity as a knower.
Symposia on the book can be found in Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2010), with commentators Linda Alcoff, Sanford Goldberg, and Chris Hookway; and in Theoria: An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science Vol. 23/1 No. 61 Jan 2008, with commentators Jesus Zamora Bonilla and Francisco Javier Gil Martin.
Social Epistemology is bringing out a special issue on Epistemic Injustice, ed. James Bohman (forthcoming, 2011, Vol. 25, Issue 4).
Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (OUP, 2007) - view abstract; read online reviews in (i) Notre Dame Philosophical Review and (ii) Philosophy (2009), 84 147-151 Cambridge University Press; download Times Literary Supplement review from right hand link.
Reading Ethics: an interactive commentary on selected texts in moral philosophy, co-written with Sam Guttenplan (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)
The Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, co-edited with Jennifer Hornsby (CUP, 2000)
'Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant?', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012), 249-276
‘Silence and Institutional Prejudice’, Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, eds. Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (OUP 2013)
'Styles of Moral Relativism - A Critical Family Tree', Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (OUP 2013)
'The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. LXXXIV (2010), 151-77
‘Can There Be Institutional Virtues?’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Special Theme: Social Epistemology) Vol. 3, eds. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (2010) pp. 235-252
'Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway', Book Symposium on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing in Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2010)
‘Scepticism and The Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time’ (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 37 (1) 2008: pp. 27-50), reprinted in A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.) Social Epistemology (OUP, 2010)
‘The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time’, Epistemology, Royal Institute of Philosophy Series (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 'translated into Spanish and reprinted in eds. Margarita Valdés and Miquel Àngel Fernàndez, Valores Epistémicos (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2010)'
‘Powerlessness and Social Interpretation’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology Vol. 3 Issue 1-2 (2006); 96-108
‘Epistemic Injustice and A Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing’, Metaphilosophy vol. 34 Nos. 1/2 Jan 2003; reprinted in M. Brady and D. Pritchard eds. Moral and Epistemic Virtues (Blackwell, 2003)
‘Life-Story in Beauvoir’s Memoirs’, The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir ed. Claudia Card (CUP, 2003)
‘Confidence and Irony’, Morality, Reflection, and Ideology ed. Edward Harcourt (OUP, 2000)