Miranda Fricker

Miranda Fricker

Research and Professional Roles

Miranda's main areas of interest are in ethics, social epistemology, and in those regions of feminist philosophy that concern social identity, power, and the authority of reason. She is currently on a two-year Leverhulme Major Research Fellowship, working on a book in moral philosophy Explaining Blame and Forgiveness.

She is Director of the Mind Association; and an Associate Editor of the Journal of the American Philosophical Association.


The Epistemic Life of Groups: Essays in the Epistemology of Collectives, eds. Brady & Fricker (forthcoming, Oxford University Press)

Applied Epistemology, Special Issue of the Journal of Applied Philosophy (forthcoming), eds. Coady & Fricker

Reading Ethics, co-authored and edited with Sam Guttenplan. An introductory textbook with interactive commentaries on classic texts in moral philosophy (Wiley-Blackwell, 2009)

Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (2007, Oxford University Press)

Cambridge Companion to Feminism in Philosophy, eds. Fricker & Hornsby (2000, Cambridge University Press)

Her 2007 monograph, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing, explores how relations of social power and identity impinge in our epistemic practices to produce distinctively epistemic forms of injustice—injustices in which someone is undermined specifically in their capacity as an epistemic subject. 

Here are two of the reviews: Notre Dame Philosophical Review and Philosophy (2009), 84 147-151 Cambridge University Press; download Rae Langton's Hypatia review and Axel Gelfert's TLS review from right hand links.

Social Epistemology brought out a Special Issue on Epistemic Injustice (2011, Vol. 26, issue 2) comprising papers by Elizabeth Anderson, James Bohman, Karen Jones, James McCollum, Jose Medina, Gloria Origgi, and Wayne Riggs; and an interview with Miranda conducted by Susan Dieleman. Subsequent exchanges came out online in the Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective.

Symposia on the book are in Episteme, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2010), with commentators Linda Alcoff, Sanford Goldberg, and Chris Hookway; and in Theoria Vol. 23/1 No. 61 (2008), with commentators Jesus Zamora Bonilla and Francisco Javier Gil Martin.

There is also an Oxford Bibliographies Online annotated reading list for Epistemic Injustice.

Recent Public lecture for Medical Humanities Sheffield

Selected Papers

'What's the Point of Blame? A Paradigm Based Explanation', Nous early view (2014)

‘Silence and Institutional Prejudice’, Out From the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy, eds. Sharon Crasnow and Anita Superson (OUP 2013)

'Styles of Moral Relativism - A Critical Family Tree', Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed. Roger Crisp (OUP 2013)

'Epistemic Justice As A Condition of Political Freedom', Synthese Vol. 190, Issue 7 (2013), 1317-1332

'Group Testimony? The Making of A Collective Good Informant', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2012), 249-276

'The Relativism of Blame and Williams’ Relativism of Distance', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supp. Vol. LXXXIV (2010), 151-77

‘Can There Be Institutional Virtues?’, Oxford Studies in Epistemology (Special Theme: Social Epistemology) Vol. 3, eds. T. S. Gendler & J. Hawthorne (2010) pp. 235-252

'Replies to Alcoff, Goldberg, and Hookway', Book Symposium on Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing in Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, Vol. 7, Issue 2 (2010)

‘Scepticism and The Genealogy of Knowledge: Situating Epistemology in Time’ (Philosophical Papers, Vol. 37 (1) 2008: pp. 27-50), reprinted in A. Haddock, A. Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.) Social Epistemology (OUP, 2010)

‘The Value of Knowledge and The Test of Time’, Epistemology, Royal Institute of Philosophy Series (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 'translated into Spanish and reprinted in eds. Margarita Valdés and Miquel Àngel Fernàndez, Valores Epistémicos (Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 2010)'

‘Powerlessness and Social Interpretation’, Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology Vol. 3 Issue 1-2 (2006); 96-108

‘Epistemic Injustice and A Role for Virtue in the Politics of Knowing’, Metaphilosophy vol. 34 Nos. 1/2 Jan 2003; reprinted in M. Brady and D. Pritchard eds. Moral and Epistemic Virtues (Blackwell, 2003)

‘Life-Story in Beauvoir’s Memoirs’, The Cambridge Companion to Simone de Beauvoir ed. Claudia Card (CUP, 2003)

‘Confidence and Irony’, Morality, Reflection, and Ideology ed. Edward Harcourt (OUP, 2000)