

What Is Wrong with Lying?

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One thing wrong with lying is that it can be manipulative. Understanding why lying can be a form of manipulation involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it, and understanding this requires seeing both how our telling things can invite trust and how trust can be a reason to believe someone. This paper aims to outline the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative and through doing so identify a unique reason for accepting testimony; a reason based on trusting a speaker's telling.

To lie is to attempt to deceive. There might be many things wrong with deceiving people, and particular wrongs associated with deceiving people by means of lying. We might have obligations of morality not to deceive others, and a further moral obligation not to deceive others by lying to them.¹ I will not debate this point but take my cue from Bernard Williams's claim that

In our own time we find it particularly natural to think deceiving people (or at least some people, in some circumstances) is an example of using or manipulating them, and that that is what is wrong with it.²

I agree: one thing wrong with lying is that it involves manipulation. The aim of this paper is to explain this manipulation and so detail how lying is wrong in this respect.

Deceiving people is an example of manipulating them only in some circumstances, and not all lies are manipulative; politeness can require and be known to require lies. To involve its distinctive manipulative mechanism a lie must purport to provide information to someone who is dependent on the liar for this information. Understanding why such lies can be manipulative then involves understanding how our telling someone something can give them a reason to believe it. And understanding this involves understanding both how our telling something

¹ Morality might require the quick thinking of Saint Athanasius who replied to his persecutors' question 'Where is the traitor Athanasius?' with the misleading truth 'Not far away.'

² Williams (2002), p. 93.

can invite another's trust, and how trust can be a reason for belief. Consequently, outlining the mechanism by means of which lies can be manipulative involves identifying a unique reason for accepting testimony; a reason based on *trusting a speaker's telling*. Since this reason is not based on evidence, its possibility shows the main theories of testimony misconceive its epistemology along one key axis.

The next three sections of the paper look at lying, telling and trusting respectively; the fourth section looks at how trusting a telling provides a reason for belief and the relevance of this to the epistemology of testimony; and then the fifth section ties it all together in showing how lies exploit a distinctive mechanism to accomplish their deceptions.

1. Lying

A lie, Williams claims, "is an assertion, the content of which is made with the intention to deceive the hearer with regard to that content."³ He adds, "it seems to me that in everyday use this is clearly its definition."⁴ This seems right about everyday use and correct up to a point, but what needs elaboration is *how* the liar intends his asserting to deceive the hearer. Lying is a form of intentional deception: a liar's primary intention is to deceive as to some matter of fact and the liar aims to accomplish this deception by asserting what he believes to be false. In doing so the liar intends to deceive as to this matter of fact by further deceiving as to his beliefs about it. However, lying requires that this deception be accomplished in a certain way.

Consider Augustine's case of two travellers faced with two roads in a region plagued by bandits, but suppose the travellers' relationship is frayed to the point of barely concealed antagonism.⁵ One might imagine one to be a Jesuit, the other a Franciscan. The Jesuit attempts a sophisticated *bluff*. Believing the high road to be plagued by bandits he asserts that it is safe. This is a lie in the everyday sense observed by Williams. The Jesuit asserts something he believes is false, that the high road is safe, with the intention of deceiving the Franciscan about just this. However, the assertion is bluff, the Jesuit intends the Franciscan to believe what he asserted but intends that he reach this belief by relying on assumptions about the context, particularly their deteriorated relationship. More precisely, he intends to deceive the Franciscan into thinking that he is trying and failing to disguise the fact that he is telling the truth; he intends to deceive him into thinking that he is

³ Ibid., p. 96.

⁴ Ibid., p. 97.

⁵ See Augustine (395).

merely pretending to lie. That is, the Jesuit intends the Franciscan to reason, "He says that the road is safe but wants to deceive me. To lie is too obvious and I am not so gullible: this is obviously a lie. He must be pretending to lie and the road must be safe as he says."⁶ And this seems the right description: the Jesuit does not lie but intends to deceive by *pretending* to lie. He does not lie because lies do not *merely* pretend to be sincere. Rather, a liar must also have the intention that this pretension of sincerity be accepted. This intention the Jesuit lacks.

A lie is an assertion made with the intention to deceive an audience with regard to its content. Right enough, but Williams's definition should be supplemented. A lie is also an assertion that purports to be sincere and aims to deceive an audience with regard to its content only through purporting to be sincere. The liar intends his audience to accept the lie because it is presented as something that the liar believes. In lying, a liar possesses two deceptive intentions: the intention to deceive about some matter of fact and the intention to deceive about what is believed about this matter of fact. Moreover, in lying the liar intends to deceive about some matter of fact *only* by means of deceiving about what is believed about this matter of fact.⁷

Now the pretence of sincerity would ensure that an audience comes to accept a speaker's lie if the audience has independent evidence that the speaker is competent. However, in lying a speaker does not intend that the audience accepts his lie because of independent evidence that he is competent anymore than he intends that the audience accepts his lie because of independent evidence that he is lying, as in the traveller case. In lying, a speaker does not intend his audience accept his lie because of independent evidence but intends his audience accept his lie *because of his telling it*. The motivation for presenting his assertion as sincere is to thereby ensure that an audience treats his intention that the audience believe that *p* as a reason for believing that *p*. In asserting that *p* and lying the speaker intends that the audience's reason for acceptance be the recognition of his intention that the audience come to believe that *p* and intends that it be so because the audience believes he believes that *p*, or believes he is sincere. This gives the following definition of lies. A speaker *S*'s assertion to an audience *A* that *p* is a lie if and only if: (1) *S* believes that *p* is false; and (2) *S* intends that (i) *A* come to believe that *p*, (ii) *A* recognizes his intention that (i), and (iii) *A*'s believing that *S* believes that *p* is *A*'s reason for (ii) being a

⁶ In short the Franciscan takes the Jesuit to be attempting a double bluff, or speaking truthfully and relying on context to make the assertion seem insincere. Whereas the Jesuit attempts a triple bluff: he lies and relies on context to make his lie seem a pretence (insincere as it were). Such convolutions are not so uncommon.

⁷ This is the definition of lies given in Simpson (1992).

reason for (i). In short, *S* intends that *A* believe he is sincere and intends this to give *A* reason for taking his intention that *A* believe that *p* to be a reason for believing that *p*.

Two clarifications are needed here. First, this is to develop the everyday sense of lies identified by Williams. There are other broader senses it doesn't capture. McNamara said the best advice he'd been given as a politician was to always answer the question he would have liked to have been asked rather than the question he was asked. In following this advice, McNamara would have disguised what he thought, and this is lying in one broad sense. In this broad sense lying is a matter of *either* uttering believed falsehoods *or* omitting to utter believed truths.⁸ Second, the intentions characteristic of lying in the everyday sense—the intentions stated in condition (2) of the definition—can equally characterize other ways of deceiving people. “Dear Sir, Mr.X’s command of English is excellent, and his attendance at tutorials has been regular. Yours, etc.” A referee who writes this may say nothing false and so need not be lying. But if this reference implicates the falsehood that Mr.X is no good at philosophy and in doing so deceives its reader, then it will have done so only through being accepted as sincere.⁹

Further, there are two particular consequences of this account of lying that need emphasis. First, an audience who knows that *p* is false would not come to believe that *p* just because he believes that another believes that *p* and intends him to believe that *p* too. So in order to come to believe that *p* on the basis of a speaker’s asserting that *p*, an audience needs to be ignorant as to whether *p* or be willing to act as if he were ignorant. In telling an audience that *p* and lying, a speaker thereby presumes that his audience is ignorant of whether *p* and so epistemically depends upon him for information as to whether *p*. Lies purport to be offering their audiences information; they purport to be *telling* their audiences something. Second, when a lie is successful as a lie—when the intentions specified in (2) are satisfied—it would be appropriate for the audience to resent the liar were this lie uncovered. Such a feeling of resentment would be appropriate not simply because the speaker intended to get the audience to believe a falsehood, but because of the way the speaker intended this *viz.* through presenting himself as sincere. These two observations should be brought together. To be in a position of dependence is to be in a position to *trust*.

⁸ “There are two primary ways to lie: to *conceal* and to *falsify*. In concealing, the liar withholds some information without actually saying anything untrue. In falsifying, an additional step is taken. Not only does the liar withhold true information, but he presents false information as if it were true.” Ekman (1985), p. 28. I regard these as two ways of being untrustworthy and only regard falsifying as lying.

⁹ Similarly, one can ‘tell’ what one knows by what one implicates; see footnote 21.

In telling an audience something, the liar then invokes the audience's trust.¹⁰ That it would be appropriate for the audience to resent the liar were the lie uncovered then follows from this reactive attitude being an appropriate response to invoked trust being let down.

At least, I will argue this last point in section three when I consider trust; before that, however, in the next section I would like to consider the speech act of telling. In lying, the liar purports to be telling the audience something, but what is it to tell another something? And how do our tellings provide others with reasons for belief?

2. Telling—The Assurance View

What justifies the beliefs we form by accepting what speakers tell us? What justifies our testimonial beliefs? A Humean answer is that these beliefs are justified because our experience has established correlations between testimony and truth. Our experience has thereby established that, on many occasions, a speaker's telling that *p* is evidence for *p*.¹¹ There is some debate about whether our experience is sufficient for this, but this debate need not be sceptical: arguably, we do not need reasons for thinking that testimony is correlated with truth; arguably, a speaker's testimony to *p* itself justifies an audience believing that *p* and the audience does not need empirical reasons for this belief.¹² The debate between these views is then the debate over whether testimony reduces as a species of evidence. However, irrespective of whether one claims that testimony offers only empirical evidence (one is a 'reductionist') or one claims that it is apriori that testimony is evidence (one is an 'anti-reductionist') both views agree that our testimonial beliefs are justified because testimony can be evidence for what is told.¹³ A contrast to this *evidential conception* of testimony is provided by the recent work of Richard Moran and Edward Hinchman, according to whom tellings should be conceived not as evidence but as *assurance*. Moran states:

On a genuinely non-Humean account, when someone tells me it's cold out, I don't simply gain an awareness of his beliefs; I am also given his *assurance* that it's cold out. This is something I could not have gained by the private observation of his behavior. When someone

¹⁰ "The liar is doubly insincere in that he or she insincerely presents a belief and insincerely invokes trust in this presentation." Simpson (1992), p. 625.

¹¹ See Hume (1777), §10, Coady (1973) and Faulkner (1998).

¹² For instance Coady (1973) and, more impressively, Burge (1993).

¹³ Contemporary reductionists, with some qualifications, include: Fricker (1987) and Lackey (2003). The anti-reductive position is more clearly held, for instance: Burge (1993), Dummett (1993), McDowell (1994), Webb (1993) and Weiner (2003).

gives me his assurance that it's cold out he explicitly assumes a certain responsibility for what I believe.¹⁴

On the assurance view, testimony to *p* provides an audience with a reason to believe that *p* not because it is evidence but because in telling an audience that *p* a speaker assumes responsibility for the audience's believing that *p*.

Now the claim that a speaker's testimony to *p* provides an audience with the speaker's assurance that *p* is entirely compatible with the claim that the speaker's testimony is evidence for *p*, so the contrast between these conceptions of testimony is better put as follows. What a speaker says and does is always evidence for what he believes—even a lie is evidence of certain attitudes—and in offering access to a speaker's beliefs, his utterances and actions always provide an audience with evidence for how the world is in some respect. However, a speaker's testimony to *p* provides evidence in this way irrespective of whether the speaker knows that it does so. So if the epistemic value of testimony is merely its value as evidence, there is the problem of how the speaker's *intentional production* of testimony could *add anything* to its epistemic value. The problem here is that a speaker's testimony is intentional with respect to inducing belief but, Moran observes,

Ordinarily, if I confront something as evidence, (the telltale footprint, or cigarette butt left in the ashtray) and then learn that it was left there deliberately, even with the intention of bringing me to a particular belief, this will only discredit it as evidence in my eyes. It won't seem *better* evidence, or even just as good, but instead like something fraudulent, or tainted evidence.¹⁵

So if the epistemic value of testimony is its value as evidence, it seems we should always prefer evidence which allows access to a speaker's beliefs that is *not* intentionally mediated in the way speech is; simple reliance on observations of the speaker's behaviour would be preferable, and ideally we should have direct access to the speaker's beliefs.¹⁶

However, this gets our epistemic relation to testimony wrong. We do take a speaker's willingness to say what he believes to provide further

¹⁴ Moran (2006), p. 278. And see also Moran (2005).

¹⁵ Moran (2006), p. 277.

¹⁶ Ideally, Moran quips, we should rely on "the effects of truth, hypnotism or brain-scans." We should always prefer to rely on what Reid termed 'natural language': "features of the face, gestures of the body, and modulations of the voice" which Nature has established to be signs of the "thoughts and dispositions of the mind" being signified. As opposed to 'acquired language,' "whose connection with the things signified by them is established by the will of men." Reid (1764), §24.

reason to believe what he says. A speaker's testimony to p provides more than (doctored) evidence that p —it constitutes a reason for believing that p —because and insofar as the speaker intends it to provide this. However, a speaker's intentions can suffice for this only by their constituting an explicit assumption of responsibility by the speaker for his utterance being a reason for belief. So it is through its presenting him as responsible, that a speaker's telling an audience that p constitutes his assurance that p . For Moran, a speaker's assurance is something like his promise that p is true. Similarly, Hinchman describes a speaker's telling that p as his offering his word that p ; this offers assurance because it entitles an audience to hold the speaker "accountable for producing a reason to believe that p ."¹⁷

The problem with evidential theories of testimony according to these assurance views is that despite providing accounts of the justification of our testimonial beliefs, evidential theories leave untouched the question of what makes it reasonable to accept testimony. They leave this question untouched because neither evidential theory involves any essential reference to *speakers telling things*. However, evidential theories could be defended at this point. They could be defended because some account of what makes it reasonable to accept testimony must follow from an account of the justification of testimonial belief, given that a testimonial belief would be unjustified if its method of acquisition were unreasonable. According to reductive theories, testimonial beliefs are justified by empirical evidence; so if an audience's testimonial belief that p is justified, the audience must have had empirical reasons for accepting testimony to p . According to anti-reductive theories, on the other hand, testimonial beliefs are justified by inherited or transmitted bodies of evidence; so if an audience's testimonial belief that p is justified, the audience must have had no empirical reasons for rejecting testimony to p . Thus evidential accounts will construe the acceptance of testimony as reasonable either on the basis of an audience possessing empirical evidence or lacking empirical counter-evidence. Consequently, the criticism of evidential theories cannot be that they fail to address the question of what makes it reasonable to accept testimony but only that they fail to do justice to *certain* testimonial relations.

First, the testimonial relation which evidential views fail to do justice to is that relation created by an audience accepting a speaker's telling. What needs clarification is the extent of this failure; or, otherwise put, the scope of the assurance view. Tellings, according to Moran, are assertoric speech acts which intend to be informative through belief in the speaker; that is, which intend to inform by means of an audience

¹⁷ Hinchman (2005), manuscript p. 11.

believing what is asserted because the speaker intends this.¹⁸ However, many intelligible utterances either do not allow such recognition of intention, or are not made with this specific intention. The anonymity of much that is written ensures it is difficult to uncover intentions beyond the writer's presenting something as true; whilst in illicitly eavesdropping we do not recognise any intention that we be informed of things. So Hinchman contrasts tellings with mere assertions. Only in explicitly telling something does a speaker assume responsibility for having given, or standing able to give, a reason for belief and this is illustrated by the difference in the epistemic position of someone who merely overhears a speaker's telling an audience something and the audience who is told this thing: the telling makes an entitlement available to the audience but the eavesdropper must get away with whatever evidence this provides.¹⁹ However, writings and overheard conversations can be highly informative.²⁰ So identified as *sources of knowledge*, writings and overheard conversations are testimony in a broad sense. Consequently, when it is identified as a source of knowledge, a natural way of understanding 'testimony to *p*' is 'an intelligible utterance that is evidence that *p*,' or (to better allow mistakes in audience judgement) 'an intelligible utterance that is taken to be evidence that *p*.' Tellings are testimony in this latter sense, but they also constitute a specific class of testimony in their own right. The criticism can then only be that evidential views fail to give an adequate account of this *specific class*.

Second, evidential views fail to do justice to the testimonial relation created by an audience accepting a speaker's telling because they mischaracterize an audience's reasons for accepting such testimony. According to evidential views, an audience's reason for accepting a speaker's telling that *p* will be either his empirical reasons for taking the speaker's telling to be evidence for *p*, or his lack of empirical reasons for believing otherwise. However, in telling an audience that *p* the speaker intends that the audience's reason for acceptance be the recognition of his intention that the audience come to believe that *p*. Moran's refinement of this Gricean formulation is to add the speaker intends this

¹⁸ "Finally, within the class of assertions whose aim *is* informative some of these have the aim that the speaker himself *be believed* and these have the force or intent of *telling* the audience something." Moran (2005), p. 347. And see Moran (2006), pp. 279-80.

¹⁹ "As I've argued, only these hearers *eo ipso* gain access to an entitlement to believe what the speaker tells them; other hearers—overhearers—gain access to the same kind of warrant to believe what she asserts as they would if she'd manifested her belief in some other kind of way." Hinchman (2005), manuscript pp. 20-1.

²⁰ Owens uses the example of illicitly read diary entries and testimony extracted under interrogation to argue that testimony is not like promising: respectively it need not be other directed nor voluntarily given. See Owens (forthcoming).

recognition to be the audience's reason *because* he intends this recognition to demonstrate to the audience that he assumes a certain responsibility; he intends his telling that *p* to be taken as an assurance or promise that *p* is true.²¹ In telling an audience something, a speaker thereby intends that the audience *believe him* and not merely believe what he says. If the audience were to accept his telling that *p* merely because his telling constituted evidence for *p*, or merely because he had no counter-evidence, this act of acceptance would be as liable to cause offence as straight disbelief. It would do so because in telling an audience that *p* a speaker expects his audience to believe that *p* because the audience recognizes him to assume a certain responsibility, and not because his telling that *p* can be treated as a reliable indicator that *p*. "The Evidential picture", Moran thereby argues, "puts speaker and audience into disharmony with each other in mislocating the connection between what the speaker does and the fact that it provides a reason for belief."²²

This criticism of evidential views, I think, is very well made. However, the alternative assurance view of our reasons for accepting testimony cannot be correct as it stands. The problem is that speakers lie and in lying—or in telling a lie, as we say—a speaker intends an audience come to believe that *p* because he recognizes the speaker's intention that he comes to believe that *p*. The recognition of a speaker's intention that he come to believe that *p* is therefore *not itself sufficient* to give an audience a reason to believe that *p*. Moran recognises this and so adds that in telling that *p*, a speaker intends an audience to take his intention that the audience believe that *p* as a reason for belief *because* the audience construes the telling as a certain assumption of responsibility. The problem with this response is that lies purport to be sincere for similar reasons. In telling an audience that *p* and lying, a speaker intends an audience to take his intention that the audience believes that *p* as a reason for belief *because* the audience believes he believes that *p*. However, an audience who was gulled by a liar's pretence of sincerity would equally construe his lie as a certain assumption of responsibility. So even if this set of intentions is sufficient to give an audience a 'reason' for accepting a speaker's testimony, the 'reason' it gives is one that can fail to move the audience. (In terms defined in section four, it fails to provide a motivating reason for acceptance.) Call this the *problem of lies*.

On the surface at least, Hinchman's response to the problem of lies is better. In order to be moved to accept a speaker's testimony by his

²¹ It is worth noting that this intention, which is characteristic of telling, can equally be present in other speech acts. We can 'tell' another what we know by the pointed questions that we ask, for instance. Recall note 9.

²² Moran (2006), p. 301.

recognising those speaker intentions described by the assurance view an audience need further believe that the speaker is not lying but is *trustworthy*. So Hinchman claims that in order to gain access to an entitlement to believe that *p* on the basis of a speaker's telling that *p*, an audience must *trust* the speaker. In telling an audience that *p*, a speaker *invites* the audience's trust. However if this is the case, then an audience's having the kind of reason for acceptance which the assurance view intends to characterise becomes *conditional* on the audience being justified in believing that a speaker is trustworthy. The problem of lies then becomes the problem that at this juncture evidential views assert themselves through seeming to exhaust the options available for being justified in this belief. The problem of lies thereby presents assurance views with a dilemma: either an audience needs to possess empirical evidence to be justified in believing that the speaker is trustworthy, which amounts to endorsing a reductive evidential theory. Or an audience is justified in believing that the speaker is trustworthy in the absence of empirical counter-evidence, which amounts to endorsing an anti-reductive evidential theory. And the dilemma is that there ceases to be a distinctive assurance position within this space of options.

The correct response, I would like to argue in section four, is that evidential views do not exhaust the options available. An audience is not 'default justified' in believing that a speaker is trustworthy and nor is this belief justified on the basis of the audience's empirical evidence. Rather, Hinchman is correct to say that a 'middle way' between these options is to be found in the idea of trust, but having identified this possibility Hinchman's account of trust fails to exploit it. So what is now required to make good these claims is some account of trust and some account of the trust that we invite in telling others things.

3. Trusting

A speaker's telling an audience that *p* assures him that *p* only to the extent that the audience trusts the speaker. The way in which the audience must trust the speaker is that he must trust the speaker to be cooperative in conversation. The audience must trust the speaker to be *trustworthy* in terms of Grice's maxim of Quality; where this rules: "Try to make your contribution one that is true," which implies "Do not say what you believe to be false" and "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence."²³ The judgement that a speaker is trustworthy, in this sense, is then the judgement that the speaker is trying to say what is true. This judgement provides a reason to think that

²³ Grice (1967), p. 27.

what is said is true because it implies that what the speaker says is probably true given the speaker's saying it. However, we can equally have reasons for believing that testimony is true which are independent of any belief that the speaker is trying to say what is true. We can trust that a speaker's testimony is true even though we think that the speaker is *untrustworthy*. In this case, to use Moran's distinction, we would believe what is said but we would not believe the speaker. So there are different ways to trust related to the distinction between believing that *p* because one trusts a speaker who tells one that *p* and believing that *p* because of the evidence provided by a speaker telling this. These senses of trust need to be distinguished.

On one understanding of trust, to trust is simply to make a judgement of reliability in a situation of known dependence. The dependence at issue here is epistemic. In telling that *p*, a speaker aims to be informative, or purports to be so, and the question of what reasons an audience has for accepting his telling and so believing that *p* is raised only if the audience finds the telling informative.²⁴ Where this is so, it is clear why a speaker's telling that *p* provides a reason for believing that *p* on this understanding of trust. To say an audience trusts a speaker's telling that *p* on this understanding is to say that the audience is dependent on the speaker for the information as to whether *p*, knows that this is so and judges that *p* is probably true on the basis of the speaker's telling it. Consequently when an audience trusts in this sense, the audience will take the speaker's telling that *p* to be a reason for believing that *p*. However this notion of trust is very thin: such a judgement of reliability in a situation of known dependence is something which covers both our relation to other subjects *and* our relation to the inanimate world. We can similarly trust a branch to hold our weight and our car to start in the morning; for instance, we can depend on our car starting, know this and trust the car in the sense that we judge it will start in this situation. "We trust one another to behave predictably in a sense", Hollis notes, "which applies equally to the world at large."²⁵ So trust in this broad sense could be defined thus:

A trusts *S* to ϕ if and only if

- (1) *A* knowingly depends on *S* ϕ -ing and
- (2) *A* expects *S* to ϕ (where *A* expects this in the sense that *A* predicts that *S* will ϕ).

²⁴ If the audience did not find the speaker's telling that *p* informative, there would be no dependence and so no trust. The audience's reason for acceptance would simply be that he already takes himself to know that *p*.

²⁵ Hollis (1998), p. 10.

Call this thin notion of trust *predictive trust*. Understood in this way, trust is simply the coupling of known dependence and expectation. And when dependence is decoupled from expectation, as circumstance can force it to be, one may speak of mere *reliance*. That is, *A* relies on *S* to ϕ if and only if *A* depends in some respect on *S* ϕ -ing. So trust in the predictive sense demonstrates a willingness to rely *because* one can predict that reliance will be successful.²⁶

Hinchman understands trust in a way similar to this definition, he states:

Trust, we can say generally, is a species of willed dependence, where the dependence is under appropriate guidance of a counterfactual sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness in the trusted. ‘Appropriate guidance’ means: you would not trust if you had evidence that the trusted were not worthy of your trust.²⁷

This defines a thin predictive sense of trust because it identifies an attitude that one could equally take to other people or the world at large. We can trust our car to start in that we can allow ourselves to depend on its doing so and allow this because we are sensitive to evidence that it would not do so and yet have no such evidence. In this position, our trusting the car to start is expressed by our attitude of expecting the car to start, where this expectation is understood as its being subjectively probable for us that the car will start. Thus Hinchman claims that as well as trusting someone to do something—a speaker to try and tell the truth—we also trust our faculties of perception and memory, which unlike speakers do not produce their ‘testimony’ intentionally.

The problem is that this understanding of trust threatens the same disharmony between audience and speaker as that generated by evidential views. It does so because the reason for belief an audience’s trusting a speaker’s telling provides need not be grounded on *the speaker’s intending* to provide such a reason. So this understanding of trust equally mislocates “the connection between what the speaker does and the fact that it produces a reason for belief.”²⁸ In inviting trust a speaker does not invite an audience to accept what he tells because the audience predicts that he is reliable or because the audience has no

²⁶ Baier similarly distinguishes trust from reliance but construes trust in a stronger interpersonal sense. Trust is “reliance on [another’s] goodwill towards one, as distinct from their dependable habits,” Baier (1986), p. 234. I do not think this is true of trust as such, but I do think that this is true of a certain type of trust and try to account for our expectation of goodwill.

²⁷ Hinchman (2005), manuscript, p. 24.

²⁸ Moran quoted above note 22.

evidence that he is not reliable. In telling an audience that p a speaker does not expect an audience's reason for belief to be *any* assessment of his reliability but simply the audience's recognition that he intends the audience to believe that p . Moreover, a speaker expects this to be the audience's reason in the sense that the speaker thinks that this *should* be the audience's reason for acceptance and he will *resent* the audience if he is disbelieved, or treated merely as a reliable sign. This is a key insight of assurance theories and it relates to the idea that *we can hold others to expectations*, where

To hold someone to an expectation is to be susceptible to a certain range of emotions if the expectation is violated, or to believe that it would be appropriate for one to feel those emotions if the expectation is violated.²⁹

It is the idea of holding others to expectations, I suggest, which is needed for identifying a thicker notion of trust, which is that trust invited by a speaker's telling that p .

The thicker notion of trust needed is one where an audience (as truster) expects a speaker (as trusted) to try to say what is true *because* the audience is dependent on the speaker doing so. That this expectation is affect-based rather than subjective-probability-based is then demonstrated by the audience's willingness to resent the speaker were his trust to be let down. It is demonstrated in a willingness to resent the speaker were he to prove untrustworthy, where one way to be so is to lie. The thick sense of trust invited when a speaker tells an audience something can be labelled *affective trust* and defined as follows.

A trusts S to ϕ if and only if

- (1) A knowingly depends on S ϕ -ing and
- (2) A expects S 's knowing that he depends on S ϕ -ing to motivate S to ϕ .

Trust in both the affective and predictive senses implies known dependence. Condition (1) is constant across both. And trust in both the affective and predictive senses implies expectation. In both, A expects S to ϕ . However, the nature of the expectations involved differ across these senses of trust. In affective trust, A expects S to ϕ in that A thinks S should ϕ and will resent S if he does not do so. The grounds of A 's holding S to this expectation are then articulated in the

²⁹ Wallace (1994), p. 23.

changed condition (2). The nature of this expectation and this changed condition requires some elaboration.³⁰

Condition (2) states that the grounds of *A*'s expectation that *S* will ϕ is *A*'s belief that *S* can recognise that he depends on *S* ϕ -ing. The contrast here is with predictive trust where *A*'s expectation (differently understood) is grounded on a background assessment of the probabilities of *S* ϕ -ing—in Hinchman's definition, on a sensitivity to evidence that *S* will not ϕ . However, *A*'s belief that *S* recognises his dependence does not fully explain *A*'s expectation because *A*'s expectation is further that *S* will ϕ *because* he recognises *A* dependence. Thus *A*'s expectation that *S* will ϕ rests on both the belief that *S* recognises his dependence and the presumption that this will move *S* to ϕ . Moreover, in *affectively* trusting *S* to ϕ , *A* adds a *further level of dependence* on *S* because his trust renders him vulnerable to that negative reactive attitude characteristic of trust being let down. So *A*'s belief that *S* recognises his dependence implies the further belief that *S* recognises the trusting attitude he takes towards this dependence. And in presuming that *S* will be moved to ϕ because *S* recognises his dependence, *A* presumes that *S* will be moved by his trust. In short, in trusting *S* to ϕ , *A* believes that *S* can recognise his trust and presumes that *S* will be *trust-responsive*.

These grounds of the expectation stated in (2) together imply that in expecting *S* (to be motivated) to ϕ , *A* presumes that *S* will ϕ . Since the presumption that *S* will ϕ , *made for these reasons*, is just the presumption that *S* will prove trustworthy, an implication of (2) is that taking an attitude of affective trust involves presuming that the trusted will prove trustworthy. Now the presumption that *S* is trustworthy is not the belief that *S* is trustworthy. A presumption unlike a belief can be made without evidence and irrespective of the evidence. This is illustrated by the case of the reformer who employs someone recently discharged from prison for theft.³¹ The reformer can trust her new employee and leave him with the till despite her evidence that he is a thief. In doing so, she expects him not to steal because she believes he recognises her dependence on him in this respect and presumes, at the very least, that the ex-convict will respond favourably to her trust. And this presumption need not be justified by the reformer's beliefs about the ex-convict's character: the reformer can trust largely irrespective of what is believed. However this is not to claim that one can trust come

³⁰ It is also worth noting that the analysandum in both predictive and affective trust is the narrow '*A* trusts *S* to ϕ ' rather than the broader '*A* trusts *S*.' This is because one can trust someone to do something—tell the truth—without trusting them in general.

³¹ This example comes from Holton (1994), p. 63.

what may, and nor is it to claim that there are no normative constraints on trust. Certainly, our ability to trust is limited, if individually variable, and, more importantly, trust expresses an attitude that can be both justified and unjustified. Like belief it is an attitude that is epistemically evaluable. Trust is justified in so far as the belief and presumption that ground its constitutive expectation are justified. This is the belief that the situation is such that trust can be recognised and the presumption that the trusted will prove responsive to it. Thus *A*'s being justified in affectively trusting *S* to ϕ depends on *A*'s being justified in believing that *S* can recognise his dependence on *S* ϕ -ing, and *A*'s being justified in presuming that this will move *S* to ϕ . The justification of this belief will be a matter of *A*'s evidence, but *A*'s being justified in this presumption is not so straightforwardly a matter of his evidence. How this presumption is justified is a question I will come back to when considering how the attitude of trust can justify an audience accepting what a speaker tells. However, for the present it should be observed that this presumption is only clearly unjustified when the evidence *obliges A* to believe that *S* will not ϕ . Thus, and supposing the prior facts about the ex-convict do not oblige the reformer to believe that he will steal once trusted with the till, the reformer's trust is not obviously unjustified.

So what is it then that makes the reformer's trust justified? What justifies an attitude of trust? How does the trust that is invited by a speaker's telling that *p* give an audience to be *a reason for believing that p*? Answering this key question will show how trust provides an assurance theory with a way of responding to the dilemma generated by the problem of lies, and it will show Hinchman's 'middle way' between reductive and anti-reductive evidential theories. The scene will then be set for explaining the manipulations of lies.

4. Reasons for Belief

In order to explain how trust provides a reason for accepting a speaker's telling, and so a reason for belief, it is first necessary to distinguish two senses of reason. The two senses I have in mind are those given by the familiar distinction between *motivating* and *justifying* reasons.³² Motivating reasons explain a subject's belief; they are, as a matter of psychological fact, what the subject takes to be reasons for belief. Justifying reasons epistemically support a subject's belief;

³² I use Pettit and Smith's terms, see Pettit and Smith (1990), p. 566. This same distinction has also been labelled one between: operational and normative reasons, Scanlon (1998), pp. 18-19; and explanatory and justificatory reasons, Moran (2001), ch. 4.

they are given by evidence and establish the subject's belief as likely to be true. Of course, any rational subject will believe his motivating reasons for belief to be justifying reasons; any rational subject will form his belief on the basis of what he takes to be evidence and so will presume that his reasons for belief are justifying. However, we are fallible in this regard. Sometimes we form our beliefs on the basis of falsehoods; sometimes we have motivating but not justifying reasons for belief. Equally, we can fail to appreciate the evidence that is available to us; sometimes we can have justifying but not motivating reasons for belief.

Now the problem of lies is that speakers lie and in lying a speaker intends that an audience believe what is told because the audience recognises the speaker's intention that he do so. Consequently, it was claimed that in order to be moved to believe what is told on the basis of recognising those speaker intentions described by the assurance view, an audience needs to trust the speaker. However, if trust is to move an audience to accept a speaker's telling, then it needs to supply a motivating reason for acceptance. So trust must supply a motivating reason for acceptance if it is to complete an assurance account of telling. However, if trust is to figure as part of an epistemological theory of testimony, it must supply a justifying reason for acceptance. The notion of affective trust, I will shortly argue, supplies reasons for belief which can be both motivating and justifying and crucially it does so in a way that preserves the insights of assurance theories. By contrast, Hinchman's account of trust is too thin to be true to these insights.

According to Hinchman, to say that A trusts S to ϕ is to say that A chooses to depend on S ϕ -ing and in doing so is guided by a sensitivity to evidence that S would not ϕ . Now trust was introduced in order to complete an *assurance* account of testimony by providing a response to the problem of lies and this provides the following solution: if an audience trusts a speaker then the audience will believe the speaker to be trustworthy and this belief will be guided by a counterfactual sensitivity to untrustworthiness. In believing a speaker to be trustworthy, an audience will have a motivating reason for taking the speaker's telling at face value and believing what is told. However, to resolve the dilemma presented by the problem of lies some account is then needed of why an audience is justified in believing that a speaker is trustworthy, where such an account is needed to explain how trust provides a justifying reason for belief. Given that trust is 'appropriately guided', Hinchman proposes that the belief that a speaker is trustworthy is justified provided it is not defeated:

That yields two defeating conditions on the presumption that *A*'s trust in *S* is reasonable and thereby a source of epistemic warrant. We might say that *A*'s trust in *S* is *not* reasonable if either (i) *S* is untrustworthy on this subject, or (ii) *A* has good evidence of *S*'s untrustworthiness on this subject.³³

This, he claims, constitutes a 'middle way' between evidential theories: an audience does not need evidence to be justified in believing that a speaker is trustworthy but trust implies a sensitivity to evidence that a speaker is not so. Now if this belief does not need evidence to be justified, that must either be because it is default justified in the absence of counter-evidence, which is just the anti-reductive view, or it must be because this belief is justified through being guided by a counterfactual sensitivity to such counter-evidence. It is the latter that is proposed: given that trust is guided by a sensitivity to evidence of untrustworthiness, trust is a reliable route to belief; so it is reasonable, on an externalist account, to accept the deliverances of a trusted source (be it testimony, perception or memory on Hinchman's view) in the absence of defeaters. This certainly explains how trust provides a motivating and justifying reason for belief but rather than resolve the dilemma proposed for assurance theories this proposal simply illustrates it. It does so because it amounts to proposing an externalist reductionist solution to the problem of lies: an audience's belief that a speaker is trustworthy is justified by its satisfaction of externalist criteria. And this solution fails to preserve the assurance claim that the intentions speakers have in telling are epistemically important: all that now matters epistemically is that the audience's belief in the speaker's trustworthiness is reliably true. What has gone wrong, I have suggested, is that Hinchman is working with too thin a notion of trust. In telling an audience something, a speaker does not invite trust in a sense that equally covers our relation to non-intentional objects. Rather, in telling an audience something, a speaker invites an audience to view his telling as an intentional response to the audience's need for information. And once trust is conceived in a way consistent with this it becomes possible to see how trust offers an assurance solution to the problem of lies and a 'middle way' between evidential theories.

The claim that affective trust supplies motivating reasons is the more straightforward so I take it first. In telling that *p*, a speaker intends that an audience come to believe that *p*, and intends that this intention be the audience's reason for coming to believe that *p*. If the audience affectively trusts the speaker, his reason for believing that *p* will be just

³³ Hinchman (2005), p. 27.

that the speaker intends that he believe that *p*. This will be the audience's reason for accepting the speaker's telling because he recognises that the speaker intends that he come to believe something and presumes that the speaker intends he come to believe something true *because* he believes that the speaker recognises his dependence and presumes that the speaker will be moved by it. In affectively trusting a speaker, an audience presumes that the speaker will try to say what is true: the audience presumes that the speaker is trustworthy (in the sense defined). An audience who trusts a speaker who tells him that *p* thereby has a motivating reason for believing that *p*. Moreover, through entailing the presumption of trustworthiness, affective trust gives rise to a motivating reason for itself and, in this limited way, affective trust is *self-justifying*.

The next question is how this motivating reason for accepting testimony can also be justifying. An idea of Pettit's offers a basis for introducing the answer to this question. People, Pettit observes, are likely to respond positively to others' trust.

The trustee is likely to have a desire, intrinsic or instrumental, for the good opinion of the trustor and of witnesses to the act of trust. The desire for that good opinion will tend to give the trustee reason to act in the way in which the trustor relies on him to act.³⁴

Pettit's idea is that a trusted individual can have an instrumental reason to become trustworthy in response to trust. This is essentially correct but what must be crucially added is that it is a presumption of affective trust that the trusted will prove trust responsive. Thus the attitude of affective trust can be seen to generate a complex of positive and negative reasons for the trusted to prove trust-responsive. It does so because holding others to an expectation involves taking an evaluative stance. This evaluative stance is expressed positively in the presumption of the audience's affective trust; minimally that his relationship with the speaker is such that the speaker will be trust-responsive, and more comprehensively that their relationship involves further shared values, whether of friendship, morality or some other nexus. And this evaluative stance is expressed negatively in the willingness to resent the speaker, to even feel betrayed by him, were he to prove untrustworthy. So if the speaker agrees with the presumption of the audience's trust, then the speaker will take himself to possess a reason to be trustworthy. That is, the speaker will minimally take the audience's trusting dependence as a reason to try and say what is true, and might further take himself to have reasons of friendship,

³⁴ Pettit (1995), p. 216.

moral reasons or reasons based on some other value to do so. However, even if the speaker rejects the presumption of the audience's trust, the resentment that any untrustworthy behaviour would provoke gives the speaker an *instrumental reason* to be trustworthy. So either way the speaker possesses a reason to be trustworthy. If the speaker responds to these reasons and so tries to tell the truth and succeeds in doing so, then the audience's affective trust will be central to an explanation of how the audience came to acquire a true belief. The existence of such a connection, when things go right, is sufficient for the motivating reason for belief provided by the audience's affective trust to also be justifying. In affectively trusting a speaker, an audience makes a presumption about the speaker that gives him a motivating reason for belief and when this presumption is fulfilled he gains a justifying reason for belief. So affective trust can provide justifying reasons for belief.

Affective trust can thereby provide a unique reason for belief. It can provide a unique reason for belief because it can provide a motivating and justifying reason that is not based on evidence. In doing so it addresses the problem of lies in a way missed by evidential theories. Trust thereby offers a 'middle way' between reductive and anti-reductive theories, as Hinchman intimated. Trust is a credulous attitude and in this sense anti-reductive evidential theories are correct: we don't need evidence to be justified in accepting what speakers tell us. However, this is not to claim that we can be justified in accepting what speakers tell us without reason; it is not to claim that we have an 'epistemic right' or 'entitlement' to accept testimony. Rather, assurance theories are correct to characterise an audience's justification for accepting a speaker's telling that *p* as distinctively based on the intentions the speaker has in telling that *p*. And since speakers can have parallel intentions in lying we do need reasons to be justified in accepting what speakers tell us. Here reductive theories are correct: the acceptance of testimony must be rationally supported and it is an audience's justification for this rationally supporting attitude that provides the audience's reason for belief. The insight of assurance theories is then that this justifying attitude need not be belief but can rather be the attitude of trust. In contrast to belief, the justification of affective trust is not directly determined by the evidence, and so the reason for belief provided by affective trust is not simply the reason provided by evidence.

Having outlined how lies can purport to be tellings, how tellings can invite trust and now how trust can provide a unique reason for accepting what is told, the stage is finally set for explaining how lies can be manipulative.

5. Trusting, Telling and Lying

An explanation of how and why lying can be a form of manipulation follows from the accounts of lying, telling and trusting just outlined. So before explaining the manipulative mechanism, it is worth recapping some of the key points these accounts made.

Both lying and telling involve a speaker intending to get an audience to believe something by means of the audience's recognition of this intention. However, since this intention is common to both lying and telling, an audience's recognition of it does not in itself provide the audience with any reason to believe the content of what is told. Thus, in telling an audience that *p* a speaker further intends the audience to construe his intention that the audience believe that *p* as an assumption of responsibility. If the audience construes it this way, the audience will have a reason for believing that *p*; however the mere fact that the speaker intends the audience to construe his intentions in this way is again no reason in itself for the audience doing so because of facts about lies. In lying, a speaker purports to be sincere, and in doing so endorses the pretence that his lie is an assumption of responsibility. Telling thereby offers an audience a certain reason for belief—a reason based on construing the telling as an assumption of responsibility—but the speaker's intentions alone cannot give the audience this reason: what is required is that the audience trust the speaker. Moreover, what is required is that an audience trust a speaker in a certain way by seeing the speaker's telling that *p* as an intentional response to his need for information whether *p*. In telling an audience that *p*, a speaker invites the audience to view things this way; the telling invites trust in the affective sense. This attitude of trust expresses an audience's expectation that a speaker should respond to his epistemic dependence by trying to tell the truth. This expectations rests on an audience's belief that a speaker who tells him that *p* can recognise his epistemic dependence and it rests on the presumption that the speaker will be moved by this to try and tell what is true. So in affectively trusting a speaker, an audience presumes that the speaker is trying to say what is true. So an audience, who affectively trusts a speaker, comes to construe the speaker's intention that he believe that *p* as the assumption of a certain responsibility. From the speaker's side of things, an audience's affective trust then provides a reason to assume this responsibility; it does so because it provides an opportunity of being trustworthy and demonstrating shared values, and it does so because acting otherwise will provoke that resentment characteristic of a let down in trust. In this way, by affectively trusting a speaker who tells him that *p*, an audience comes to have a reason for believing that *p* that can be both motivating and justifying.

Given this account of lying, telling and trusting, lies can be seen to be manipulative in three respects. First, lies purport to be tellings inviting an audience's affective trust. So when a speaker tells an audience that *p*, and lies, he purports to be offering an audience information as to whether *p*, which the audience needs, and he invites the audience to believe that *p* on the basis of that self-supporting reason characteristic of affective trust. So the first way that lies manipulate is that a lie *by itself* offers an audience a non-evidential motivating reason for belief. Second, in telling that *p* a speaker expects an audience to believe him because the audience affectively trusts him, and if the audience disbelieves him or believes that *p* only on the evidence of his saying it, then the speaker will feel slighted by the audience's response. So in telling a lie, a speaker purports to adopt an attitude that threatens an audience with resentment if the audience does not believe him. And this threat holds if the audience is uncertain and seeks the reassurance of evidence. In this way lying involves a further pretence: it commits the liar to acting as if he resents any response to the lie which is not acceptance on the basis of trust. Since we seek to avoid generating resentment in others, in lying and purporting to tell an audience something, a liar thereby gives an audience an instrumental reason not to seek the reassurance of evidence. So the second way lies are manipulative is that not only does a lie itself offer an audience a reason for belief but it further provides the audience with a reason for neither questioning nor rejecting the lie. Third, in purporting to be sincere, the liar apparently gives an audience evidence that both these reasons are good ones. However, the liar does not react to an audience's epistemic dependence in the way that the trusting audience presumes. So the presumption of an audience's trust is false and since it is based upon a falsehood, the audience's motivating reason for acceptance has no justificatory force. Equally, it is false that the liar would react to an audience's questioning disbelief with anything more than sham resentment.³⁵ So the audience's seemingly good instrumental reason for not rejecting or questioning the lie is similarly hollow. So the third way lies are manipulative is that their sincere presentation appears to give an audience evidence for a false conception of the nature of his reasons for belief. In sum, in telling an audience that *p* and lying a speaker manipulates the audience because he offers the audience a motivating reason to believe that *p*, he gives the audience an instrumental reason for not questioning whether *p*, and both these reasons purport to be justifying when in fact they are not so.

³⁵ This is particularly so if the lie were accepted on the basis of an audience's having his confidence bolstered by independent evidence since this would result in the satisfaction of the liar's primary deceptive intention.

To understand the strength of the reactive attitude we can demonstrate to this manipulation, one then needs to consider how interlocutors can be related to the presumption on which affective trust rests. The presumption is that, at the very least, the trusted will be moved by trust. This is often embedded in further beliefs about the trusted and what is shared with them.³⁶ A lie, through purporting to be a telling and inviting an audience's affective trust engages this presumption and, where they are present, engages these further beliefs. It does so in that the liar both invites the audience to make this presumption and threatens resentment if the audience does not do so. What explains the strength of an audience's resentment on discovering that he has been lied to is then that the lie denies a presumption of relationship with the speaker which the speaker invited the audience to make and would have seemingly resented if he had not done so. So just as we can feel compelled by our values and view of our relationships to trust others, so we can similarly feel compelled to accept their lies. This further magnifies that feeling generated by the discovery that we've been lied to.^{37,38}

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³⁶ However, trust need not depend on any substantial background of belief, crucially it does not require any belief in the trusted's trustworthiness, and, indeed partly because of this, extending trust is a means of creating and extending a community defined in terms of shared values.

³⁷ This attempts to develop part of Simpson's claim that "lying is morally interesting because it involves a certain sort of betrayal, and this betrayal is of something invoked, and not just intended." Simpson (1992), p. 626.

³⁸ Many thanks are owed to Bob Stern, Matthew Soteriou, Mike Martin and an anonymous referee. This paper was partly written whilst I held a research fellowship at the University of London Institute of Philosophy.

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