The Arguments of Job's Three Friends
Published in On the Way to the Postmodern: Old Testament Essays 1967-1998, Volume 2 (JSOTSup, 292; Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998), pp. 719-34What I am offering here is a rhetorical analysis of rhetoric, that is, an application of certain methods of rhetorical criticism in the broadest sense to rhetoric in a narrower sense (declamatory speech designed to persuade). I hope to show that awareness of rhetorical devices can lead to large-scale exegetical gains, and, at the least, can help to preserve the interpreter from major errors.
It would be a very considerable undertaking to argue in detail for the coherence of the speeches of Job's three interlocutors, and the distinctive viewpoints each represents. The concern of this paper is more limited: it is Þrst to treat three rhetorical elements in their speeches that are relevant to the questions of their coherence and of their distinctiveness, and secondly to set out some general arguments for their coherence and their distinctiveness.
1. Fundamental Rhetorical Elements
a. Tonality
The mood, or tone, of each of the speakers in each of their speeches is fundamental to interpretation. Perception of tonality depends partly on the subjective impression of the reader, and certainly cannot be determined in advance of engagement with the whole of the speech, or indeed of the three speeches, of the friend. Clues to tonality are sometimes given rather unmistakably by the exordium and conclusion of a speech; for example, Eliphaz in ch. 4 begins: 'Are we to speak to you a word? You cannot bear it. But neither can we bear to hold back our words' (4.2), and in ch. 5 he concludes: 'Hear, and know for your own good' (5.27). The tone in this speech thus appears to be deferential, positive, sympathetic.
But exordium and conclusion tones can be misleading: the Þrst speeches of both Bildad and Zophar each end with a similar contrast between the fate of the righteous and that of the wicked, the Þnal verse marking a downbeat note in each case (8.22; 11.20). We might infer from the similarity that the tonality of the two speeches is identical; but in fact it is different, since in Bildad's speech the Þnal contrast proceeds from an unconditional afÞrmative, 'He will yet Þll your mouth with laughter' (8.21), whereas in Zophar's speech it proceeds from a hypothetical 'If you set your heart aright . . . surely then . . . you will lie down with no one to frighten you' (11.13, 15, 19). Similarly, in the second cycle, all the friends' speeches conclude with a lengthy elaboration of the fate of the wicked (Eliphaz, 15.20-35; Bildad, 18.5-21; Zophar, 20.5-29), but the signiÞcance of these depictions varies considerably, as we will see below.
Some further clues in the text to the tonality of the speech-beyond those of exordium and conclusion-must be sought.b. Nodal Sentences
In most of the speeches there appear one or two sentences, usually addressed to Job directly, that further deÞne the tonality of the speech as well as pinpointing the content of the speech's argument.
Eliphaz's Þrst speech provides two good examples. In 4.6, 'Is not your piety your source of conÞdence? Does not your blameless life give you hope?', Eliphaz's mood may be felt to be mildly reproachful or wholly encouraging, but certainly not hostile, sarcastic or dismissive. Unless he says 'piety' and 'blameless life' with a sneer-which the rest of the speech gives us no reason to suppose-he is essentially afÞrming Job in speaking without qualiÞcation of his 'piety' (yir'â) and his 'blameless life (tøm dëråkîm). To be sure, the previous verse has-at Þrst hearing-a rather ambiguous tonality: 'Now, when it meets with you, you cannot bear it! It strikes at you, and you are dismayed' (v. 5). By itself, it could be heard as a rather aggressive assessment of Job's impatience; but in the shadow of the clear tonality of v. 6, it can only be heard as sympathy, even if expressed with a mild and unhurtful irony.
A second nodal sentence may be found in 5.8: 'As for me, I would seek God; it is to God that I would commit my suit'. Here Eliphaz puts himself in Job's shoes and suggests what he would do in the same situation. It is not exactly non-directive counselling, but it is certainly non-authoritarian. Eliphaz does not command, threaten, cajole or humiliate Job in any way, but enters into his situation with all the imagination and sympathy he can muster. The facts that he is far from recognizing Job's real situation, that patience is for Job the 'hard thing' (as Hopkins's sonnet has it),/1/ that the author of the book may be, via Eliphaz, mocking the incapacity of theoretical wisdom to handle the realities of human experience,/2/ are all beside the point. This remains a crucial sentence for perceiving Eliphaz's mood and message.
Other nodal sentences in the friends' speeches, which cannot be examined in detail here, can be identiÞed in the following: of Bildad: 8.4-6; 18.4; 25.4; of Zophar: 11.4-6; 20.4-5; [27.13-14]; of Eliphaz: 15.4-5; 22.21, 30.c. Topoi
All the speeches of the book use stylized descriptions or accounts, which I propose to call topoi. E.C. Kingsbury,/3/ in another context, deÞned topoi as 'general rhetorical patterns, which may be used as building blocks for literary structures', a somewhat loose deÞnition, but in line with what I have in mind. William J. Urbrock's Harvard dissertation discussed twelve such topoi (which he called 'themes') in Job./4/ Such topoi frequently form the bulk of a speech (as they do in the second cycle of speeches), and account for the discursiveness of the book that many modern readers Þnd tiresome. More signiÞcant exegetically is the fact that the function of a topos is often far from its obvious signiÞcance when considered out of context. A topos on a particular subject may serve quite different purposes in different speeches according to the tonality and argument of the speech.
The Þrst speech of Eliphaz again offers us a useful example. In 4.8-9 (or 4.8-11, if the destruction of the lions is a symbol of the destruction of the wicked) we have a brief topos on the fate of the wicked. Some commentators, like Dhorme/5/ and Weiser,/6/ Þnd Eliphaz to be intentionally insulting Job by assuming him to be the cause of his own misfortune. Any reader, indeed, must wonder why, in a speech that has set out to be reassuring, the retribution of the wicked and their destruction by God should Þnd a place. But in the light of the tonality of the speech, and especially of the nodal v. 6, it becomes impossible to view this description as any kind of criticism or warning. On the contrary, precisely because Eliphaz's intention is encouraging, this topos depicts a fate that is the opposite of what is in store for Job. Job is among the righteous (v. 6); the innocent and upright are not cut off, that is, die in their prime (v. 7); the wicked, on the other hand, are suddenly brought to an end (vv. 8-9). Precisely because Job is righteous he need have no fear that he is about to die; he can have hope. This interpretation is conÞrmed by Eliphaz's words of encouragement in 5.18-26, which assure Job that he will not die until he has reached a ripe old age (5.26). In this context, the function of the topos is plain; in other cases it must be admitted that its function is not so obvious.
In Eliphaz's second speech (15.1-35) there is a lengthier topos on the miserable life and the fearsome fate of the wicked (vv. 17-35). Some have argued that Eliphaz has by now become convinced that Job is an evildoer, and have read this topos as Eliphaz's prognostication of the fate in store for Job./7/ It is true that in this speech Eliphaz takes a Þrmer line with Job: he reproaches him for so letting his tongue run away with him that, with his multitude of windy words, Job has ceased to behave like the wise man he really is (v. 2). And even though this sentence may be more a recognition of the tempestuousness of Job's speech than a reproach of his language in demanding vindication from God and in speaking of God's destructive power (cf. 12.13-15), Job has without question been irreligious ('doing away with the fear of God', v. 4); indeed, Job's mouth, tongue and lips have been leading him into sin ('Your mouth increases your wrongdoing', v. 6)./8/ The same point, that Job is not being wise in letting his tongue lead him into sin, is reiterated in the second strophe of the speech (vv. 7-16): Job has not the wisdom of Adam (v. 7), nor that of the prophets (v. 8a), nor even that of his older friends (vv. 9-10). It is through lack of wisdom, Eliphaz is charitable enough to think, that Job is venting his anger (v. 13; cf. neb) against God.
But as for the relevance of the life and destiny of the wicked, which is the subject of the topos that occupies the second half of his speech, although Eliphaz insists (as in 4.17-19) that no one can be perfectly righteous and therefore must expect some suffering (vv. 14-16), he is clearly maintaining that Job is not one of the truly wicked, and so this topos concerns what does not apply to him. Job has not, like the wicked, 'writhed in pain all his days' (v. 20), nor does he 'conceive mischief and bring forth evil' (v. 35). He does not belong to 'the company of the godless' (v. 34), and if he 'bids deÞance to the Almighty' (v. 25) that only shows that he is making a serious mistake and forgetting where his loyalty lies. First appearances to the contrary, then, this topos does not function as a judgment upon Job's character but as an elaborate sketch of the kind of person Job is not, but is in danger of becoming.
In the case of Zophar's second speech (20.1-29), however, a topos on the same subject probably has quite a different intention. Zophar's attitude towards Job has been established by the nodal sentences of 11.5-6: Job is a secret sinner from whom God exacts less than his guilt deserves. Zophar's disquisitions on the brevity of the happiness of the wicked (20.4-11), on the 'fate-producing deed' (20.12-22), and on the sudden end of the wicked (20.23-29) all apply directly to Job. Far from being an encouragement to Job, this portrayal of the end of the wicked is not even a warning: it is a prediction.
The topoi do not therefore offer, of themselves, insight into their function in the arguments of Job's friends, but must rather be interpreted from the matter that lies outside them. This is not a very surprising conclusion to reach in the case of such traditional or stock material, but it is remarkable what an important role the topoi play in some commentators' analysis of the Joban arguments. Especially if the commentator adopts the principle of synopsis, i.e. compression of the content of each speech to a few lines of prose,/9/ the topoi come to hold a disproportionate and often misleading place in the interlocutors' argument.d. Verb Modality
Another aspect of Hebrew rhetoric that is frequently ignored is the range of modalities covered by the indicative form of the Hebrew verb in the 'imperfect'./10/ Combined with the range of temporal senses the imperfect has (future, present, past continuous; and perhaps also it is sometimes identical with 'preterite' or 'point' tense) is the series of modal implications it may convey, such as we would represent in English by the modal auxiliaries 'may', 'should', 'can', 'would', and so on. The student of the rhetoric of these speeches cannot assume that the speaker afÞrms everything he expresses with an 'imperfect' verb (and most verbs in these speeches are 'imperfects'). Rhetoric thrives on the modulation of possibility, obligation, probability, and reality, and trades in hypotheticals and exhortatives. In the poetry of these speeches, most of these nuances are not explicit linguistically, and may be grasped only by the sensitized reader.
Simply to illustrate the point, and to remark on how a rather straightforward example of a modal use of a verb directly affects the argument of a speech, I direct attention to a short passage in Eliphaz's Þrst speech concerning 'those who dwell in houses of clay' (4.19), viz. humankind generally. Of them he says, if we read his speech in the rsv:Between morning and evening they are destroyed;
they perish for ever without any regarding it.
If their tent-cord is plucked up within them,
do they not die, and that without wisdom?Translations and commentaries alike universally assume that Eliphaz is speaking of humankind in general./11/ It seems far more likely, however, that verbs in these sentences are to be read modally. They are not statements of general actuality but of particular possibility. Verse 20 means, not that all human lives are ephemeral, but that humankind is so fragile that a person may be destroyed (yukkattû, 'pulverized') between a dawn and a dusk. All people do not expire so rapidly, for some suffer lingering deaths. Nor do all die between dawn and dusk, for some-to be prosaic-die between dusk and dawn (cf. a Babylonian text, 'he who in the evening was alive is dead in the morning')./12/
Plainly also it is untrue that humans in general perish 'without anyone setting it to heart' (if that is how mibbëlª mªm is to be translated); what serves Eliphaz's point about the fragility of human beings as 'dwellers in houses of clay' (v. 19) is that they can be of such slight account that they may die without their passing being noticed. Likewise, it can hardly be imagined that Eliphaz maintains that humankind as a whole (himself included!) invariably dies 'without wisdom'; rather he argues the insubstantiality of the human frame from the fact that it is possible for a person to live and die without ever gaining the wisdom that he, as one of the wise, regards as essential for a truly human life.
By understanding the verbs of these sentences modally, that is, in this case, as equivalent to 'may be destroyed . . . may perish . . . may die', we not only restore the emphasis of Eliphaz to the fragility of human existence, rather than its brevity, and relieve him of the responsibility of wildly untrue generalizations, but also help to re-create coherence in the speech. For if these verses are taken as general statements about humankind, Eliphaz will have destroyed, by the time he reaches the mid-point of his speech, the premise from which he began, and on the basis of which alone he can offer consolation to Job, namely that humankind is divided into two camps, the innocent and the wicked (vv. 7-8), that each camp receives its proper reward (v. 8), and that Job unquestionably belongs to the former camp (vv. 3-4, 6). It is always possible, of course, that the speech lacks coherence, but such is an unhappy conclusion to which we may Þnally be driven only when we have allowed for the possibility of modal interpretations./13/
The foregoing are elements of rhetoric that can, if we make due allowance for them, inþuence our analysis of the arguments in the book.2. Coherence and Individuality
My concern in this section of the paper is a more ambitious one. It is to afÞrm: (i) the coherence of the speeches of Job's three friends; and (ii) the individuality or distinctive viewpoints of the three friends. For convenience, I shall discriminate in (i) between coherence within a single speech (a: micro-coherence) and coherence throughout the whole body of the speeches of each of the friends in turn (b: macro-coherence). I shall interpose between my claims for micro- and macro-coherence the evidence for (ii), the individuality or distinctive viewpoints of the individual speakers.
a. Micro-Coherence
It is customary to despair of the possibility of discovering coherence, even on the scale of the single speech, within the book of Job. G. von Rad, for example, concluded that Eliphaz's Þrst speech (chs. 45), 'does not in any sense consist of a fairly uniÞed sequence of thought, but is a series of entities of very different kinds, each of which has its own structure of thought and thesis within itself. Eliphaz offers Job at least Þve different and remarkably slightly connected propositions to ponder.'/14/
As against such a position, we may allow that it is not necessary to afÞrm the logical validity of an argument in order to maintain its coherence. We may, for example, deny that in 4.18-21, part of which we have examined above, a logic operates that is valid by standards either of the author's day or of our own: for, at least in our judgment, it does not follow that humans are more untrustworthy than angels just because they 'dwell in houses of clay' whereas angels presumably do not. But the coherence of these verses is beyond question: they are linked by an a maiore ad minus argumentation that is superÞcially, at least, plausible.
Granted such an understanding of 'coherence', especially if the subordinate role of topoi and the dominating role of nodal sentences is taken into account, and if allowance is made for the range of verb modality (which may, for example, transform what is apparently an assertion into a statement of possibility), I would claim that coherence within each speech always emerges-except perhaps toward the end of the third cycle of speeches. The arguments of the nine speeches of the friends may thus be brieþy stated:
1. In the Þrst cycle, Eliphaz's speech (chs. 45) starts from the fundamental position that the innocent are never 'cut off'. Job is an innocent man and therefore can expect to continue living (4.6). That general point made, Eliphaz can proceed to nuance the concept of 'innocence'. In fact, he argues, perfect innocence, 'purity' or 'righteousness' (4.17), is not to be found among humans, so even the most innocent, like Job, must expect to suffer deservedly on occasion. Job is suffering on this occasion, so the only practical advice Eliphaz can give to Job is to be patient (commit his case to God, 5.8), since his suffering is bound to be soon over.
2. The Þrst speech of Bildad (ch. 8) is no less coherent. Like all the friends, he believes that suffering is punishment, and that the death of Job's children is proof of that (8.4 'Your children have sinned against him; so he has abandoned them to the power of their own transgression'; the 'if' ('im) of 'if your children have sinned' is not hypothetical, as neb has rightly recognized. God does not pervert justice (8.3); so if there is suffering there has been sin. Job himself, however, has not been struck dead, so the possibility is still open that he is innocent of any sin deserving of death. Bildad therefore afÞrms that if Job is 'pure and upright' he will be delivered from his afþiction. The comparatively cheerful note on which Bildad concludes (8.21-22) leaves open the question of Job's innocence, and the topos of 8.8-19 on the theme 'no effect without a cause' (the death of the wicked [vv. 13-19] being a prime example of this truth) serves only to reinforce Bildad's fundamental position: justice is not perverted.
3. In Zophar's speech in the Þrst cycle (ch. 11), the argument is again plain. Starting from the same presupposition as the other friends, that suffering is deserved, he concentrates wholly upon the fact that Job is suffering. This can only mean that he is a sinner; and since Job has failed to acknowledge his sinfulness, claiming that he is 'clean in God's eyes' (11.4), it follows that Job is a secret sinner. In fact, Zophar argues, if the truth were known it would no doubt be apparent that God exacts of Job less than his guilt deserves (v. 6c)! The logic of Zophar's argument is on this point rather shaky, but the coherence of his rhetoric is beyond question./15/ Zophar's reference to the wisdom of God (v. 6) leads him into a digressive topos on that theme (vv. 7-12), but the thread of his speech is picked up again at v. 13 where he, like all the friends, offers direct practical advice to Job: Job must, in a word, repent (v. 14). The lot of the repentant and therefore righteous man is contrasted with that of the wicked in a concluding topos (vv. 15-20).
4. In the second cycle, Eliphaz's speech (ch. 15) takes cognizance of Job's responses and asserts that Job is not speaking like a wise man but allowing his tongue to run away with him (15.2-6; v. 5 should probably be translated 'your mouth makes you guilty of great wrongdoing, and your tongue chooses guileful words'). Indeed, it is lack of adequate wisdom that is Job's chief fault (vv. 7-16): he has not the wisdom of Adam (v. 7) nor of the friends themselves (vv. 8-9). If he were wise, he would know that no human-nor any angel-is wholly innocent, and that a certain amount of suffering can only be expected (vv. 14-16). Nevertheless, Job is not wicked, and the topos on the wicked and their fate (vv. 17-35) is a description of precisely what Job is not. He is therefore not destined for ultimate disaster or continued suffering.
5. Bildad's second speech (ch. 18) is almost entirely devoted to a topos on the fate of the wicked, and as such is thoroughly coherent. What he means by it as far as Job is concerned cannot be discerned from the speech itself, but must be assessed in the context of all three of his speeches.
6. Zophar's second speech (ch. 20) is even more thoroughly preoccupied with an extended topos on the fate of the wicked, developing three themes: the brevity of the rejoicing of the wicked (vv. 4-11), the self-destructive nature of sin (vv. 12-22), and the sudden end of the wicked (vv. 23-29). Its content is not essentially different from the speeches of Eliphaz and Bildad, but, as with theirs, its function must be understood in the context of his other speeches.
7. In the third cycle, Eliphaz (ch. 22) eschews extensive topos material and delivers a three-pronged address to Job. In its Þrst movement (vv. 2-11), he asks, 'Is not your wickedness great?' (v. 5); it must be, for only guilt explains suffering, and presumably, only great guilt can explain great suffering. In the second movement (vv. 12-20), since Job admits to great suffering but not to great guilt, it follows that the guilt must be hidden (we note that Eliphaz is being pushed towards Zophar's position). In the third movement (vv. 21-30), Eliphaz's continuing conviction of Job's essential innocence surfaces again, and the most convincing picture of the restoration Job can rightly hope for is painted (we noted that Eliphaz retreats from the logic of Job's suffering to the logic of Job's character).
8. Bildad's third speech (ch. 25), as it stands, simply rehearses the by now conventional idea that nothing in the created order, and especially not humans, can show any kind of 'cleanness' (vv. 4-5). If some disturbance to the text has occurred in the course of transmission, and if 26.5-14 also is rightly to be attached to this third speech of Bildad,/16/ the speech continues with a topos upon the creatorial wisdom and power of God (the two attributes are frequently virtually equated in Job). God's unsearchable wisdom in company with his irresistible power (cf. 26.14) is the guarantee that 'uncleanness' in the world of nature and humanity will be detected and dealt with by God.
9. Zophar's third speech does not, of course, appear in the present form of the text (and we could therefore immediately forego an attempt to display its coherence). Suppose, however, that it has been erroneously incorporated (not by the Þnal editor, but in the course of transmission) into Job's tenth speech (27.128.28) and that it consisted of 27.1328.28./17/ It should occasion no surprise that a speech from Zophar should dwell upon 'the portion of a wicked man with God' (27.13-27), to be followed immediately by a disquisition on the secret wisdom of God (28.1-28), since these two themes have been combined in Zophar's Þrst speech (ch. 11). The argument, not so clearly stated as in ch. 11, will be the same: the fate of the wicked is lodged with God ('im 'l), 'with God', 27.13), because God alone is the master of the knowledge required to dispense justice among human beings (28.23-28). Even the profound and intricate knowledge acquired by humankind (28.1-11) gives them no sure hold upon real 'wisdom', hid as it is 'from the eyes of all living' (28.21). The best wisdom humanity can have is to acknowledge the omniscient Yahweh and keep his commandments (28.28). A less bold reconstruction of Zophar's third speech, which allocates 27.7-23 together with 24.18-24 to it,/18/ will have even less difÞculty in discerning coherence in the speech; for the preoccupation of the speech will be with the 'portion' of the wicked, a topos simply prefaced by a few sentences of exordium (27.7-12).
Only a closer analysis can demonstrate the validity of the general argument presented here; but enough has perhaps been said to suggest that in each of the speeches of the three friends a high degree of coherence is to be found.b. Individuality or Distinctive Viewpoints
Students of the book of Job have frequently attempted to discriminate between the friends on psychological grounds. Thus, Arthur Quiller-Couch, a literary critic of a former era, observed: 'I Þnd Eliphaz more of a personage than the other two: grander in the volume of the mind, securer in wisdom; as I Þnd Zophar rather noticeably a mean-minded greybeard, and Bildad a man of the stand-no-nonsense kind'./19/ A British acquaintance conÞdes that he has always seen Eliphaz as a smooth southerner from the Home Counties, Bildad as a provincial Midlander, and Zophar as a blunt Yorkshireman. Robert Gordis Þnds Eliphaz 'the most digniÞed and urbane of the Friends . . . the profoundest spirit among them'; Bildad is purely 'a traditionalist who contributes little more to the discussion than a restatement of accepted views'; while Zophar, 'probably the youngest, possesses the brashness and dogmatism associated with youth'./20/ There may be a modicum of truth in some of these distinctions, but what one really wants to see-and what one looks for in vain among the commentaries-is a set of notations of the distinctiveness, logical or theological, in their various argumentations. Only genuinely distinctive argumentation would fully justify the introduction of three interlocutors into the body of the book. If they all have the same point to make, the book is indeed long-winded and þabby; but if, as I argue, the friends each take a distinctive position vis-à-vis Job in spite of sharing the most fundamental presuppositions, their presence is not only not gratuitous but positively essential for the exploration of the problem raised by the book.
What I see as their distinctive viewpoints has already become partly visible in outlining the coherence of each of their speeches. But to put it directly, I can do no better than quote some sentences that are somewhat buried away in a corner of Marvin Pope's commentary, in which alone I have found, in embryonic form at least, a presentation of the friends' distinctive viewpoints that jibes with my own. 'Eliphaz appears to concede that Job's piety and conduct have been exemplary. Job, thus, should have conÞdence and hope that God will deal with him accordingly . . . To concede that Job was innocent would wreck [Bildad's and Zophar's] argument completely. What Bildad says is conditional: if Job were innocent, God would restore him. Zophar is sure that God must have something against Job and could make it known if he cared to speak about it.'/21/ I should wish to nuance Pope's presentations a little: Eliphaz does not only appear to concede Job's piety to be exemplary; he actually assumes it and argues from it. And Zophar's point is not precisely that God could make known, if he cared to, what it is that he has against Job, but that no matter whether or not God divulges what he knows to be Job's sin, he is certainly punishing Job for it (God knows which humans are worthless and marks them down for punishment, 11.11).
The distinctiveness of the friends' arguments can be expressed in two further ways: Þrst, Eliphaz argues from the piety of Job in order to offer consolation; Bildad argues from the contrast between the fates of Job and Job's children in order to offer warning; Zophar argues from the suffering of Job in order to denounce Job. Secondly, as becomes clear from the friends' directives to Job, Eliphaz's intention is to encourage Job to patience and hope (5.8; 4.6), Bildad's intention is to urge Job to search his heart before God in order to ensure that he is not guilty of crimes such as those for which his children have died (8.5-6); Zophar's intention is to summon Job to repentance for sins that he clearly has already committed (11.6c).
It may be added, parenthetically, that the position of Elihu represents yet another variation on the same fundamental supposition of the causal nexus between sin and suffering: viz., suffering may be discipline, though not in the way the other friends have viewed it; for it may be not the penalty for sin already committed, but a warning, given in advance, to keep a person back from sin (33.19-28)./22/ In advancing this view Elihu correctly proclaims himself opposed both to the three friends and to Job (32.6-12; 33.5, 12).c. Macro-Coherence
The coherence of the stance taken by each of the friends throughout his set of three speeches (macro-coherence) has already been to some extent established by the analysis given above of the argument of each individual speech. What we have to remark upon here is that the macro-coherence of each of the three arguments depends upon our recognizing the stance adopted in the Þrst cycle as determinative for the whole of the particular friend's utterances.
From that position, we may go on to allow the content of the second and third cycles of speeches, largely consisting of topos material to be interpreted according to the previously announced intention of the speaker. As for the second cycle, I have noted above (under 1.c) how Eliphaz's afÞrmation of Job's piety in the Þrst cycle (chs. 45) requires us to read his description of the fate of the wicked in the second cycle (ch. 15) as a depiction of what Job's fate is certainly not. Likewise, Bildad's exhortation to Job in his Þrst cycle speech (ch. 8) to search his heart and take warning from the fate of his children becomes the hermeneutical clue for the reading of his second cycle speech (ch. 18): the fate of the wicked is a possibility that confronts Job, but may yet be avoided by him. In similar fashion, the Þrst cycle speech of Zophar (ch. 11), asserting that Job's present suffering proves him to be a sinner (albeit a secret sinner), demands that his second cycle speech (ch. 20) be understood as descriptive of the future he sees in store for Job-assuming, of course, that Zophar's plea for Job's repentance (11.13-14) is ignored.
As for the third cycle of speeches, the same principle applies, that the topos material is to be interpreted in the light of the speaker's stance distinctively spelled out in the Þrst cycle. The most striking, and perhaps the only signiÞcant, apparent exception to this generalization is the speech of Eliphaz in the third cycle (ch. 22), and for this reason it deserves our special attention. In two respects Eliphaz's argument in this speech is in full accord with his position in his Þrst speech (chs. 45): he believes that Job will be delivered 'through the cleanness of [his] hands' (22.30), and his advice is to 'come to terms with God' (v. 21, neb) and 'be at peace'. In another respect, however, he seems to be wholly at variance with his former position: he seems to accuse Job of untold wickedness ('no end to your iniquities', v. 5), mainly in the nature of social injustice: 'you have exacted pledges of your brothers for nothing . . . withheld bread from the hungry . . . sent widows away empty' (vv. 6-9). These are the most speciÞc, most harsh, and most unjust words spoken against Job in the whole book, and it is strange to Þnd them on the lips of Eliphaz, out of all the friends.
Of course it is possible to maintain that there has been a change in Eliphaz's attitude, and to argue that Eliphaz has lost patience with Job, and in his exasperation has charged Job with crimes that he could not possibly have believed Job had committed when he addressed him in chs. 45. Most commentators, indeed, take Eliphaz's accusations at their face value, but there is one indication that Eliphaz's strictures may be read somewhat differently. That is the fact that in all the cases Eliphaz mentions it is the neglect of some social duty that Job is charged with. Eliphaz believes, as do all the friends, that Job is suffering for some cause-brief though the suffering may be (4.5); and since the cause cannot be found in any wrong that Job has done, for he seems to have done none, his sin must lie in what he has failed to do. To say that Job has stripped the poor of their clothing need not mean that he has actively done any such thing, but rather that he must have failed to offer clothing to some needy person; and so on. (In the same way, the psalmist who reproaches God for having 'forsaken' him [Ps. 22.2] does not mean that God has actively departed from him, but that he has failed to come to his help; hence the psalmist's plea is not 'return to me', but 'hasten to my help', v. 20). Doubtless, since Job is not absolutely perfect (nor omnicompetent), there will be certain members of Job's community untouched by his social concern; in hyperbolic fashion Eliphaz pictures their plight as Job's wilful fault. Only in this way can he explain why 'snares are round about' Job and why his 'light is darkened' (vv. 10-11).
From this perspective the meaning of 22.2-4 becomes plain. When Eliphaz asks, 'Is it any pleasure to the Almighty if you make your ways blameless?' (v. 3), he does not disparage righteousness or the fear of God. He is rather saying that it is not for Job's righteousness-which Eliphaz fully recognizes-that God 'enters into judgment' with him (v. 4), but for leaving undone those things that ought to have been done (vv. 6-9). They must be sins of omission rather than sins of commission (which admittedly his language describes, prima facie) that are Job's 'great wickedness' (v. 5); for Eliphaz has no other way of explaining Job's suffering. It is true that he has moved somewhat beyond the position he had adopted in chs. 45, where he Þrst afÞrmed Job's piety, and then allowed that the righteous are not perfectly so. Now he will specify in what ways he conceives Job to have been open to reproach. But this is only a development of his original position, and no doubt need be cast on the overall coherence of Eliphaz's attitude and argument.
Less taxing is the question of the relation of the third cycle speeches of Bildad (? and Zophar) to their general position outlined in their opening speeches. If we adhere to the Masoretic assignment of ch. 25 alone to Bildad, his insistence upon the 'uncleanness' of all created beings harmonizes with his original afÞrmation that since God does not pervert justice (8.3) sin must inevitably be punished. If we extend Bildad's speech by the addition of 26.5-14, we may see in these verses further illustration of the incontrovertible justice of the Almighty. And if Zophar's third speech is to be salvaged from the material of chs. 27 and 28, we Þnd only further illustration of the twin themes of the all-seeing wisdom of God (cf. 11.7-11) and the doom of the wicked foreseen and prepared by that selfsame wisdom (cf. 11.20) that we have observed in Zophar's initial speech.
The intentions of this paper have been to show that the arguments of Job's three friends, though sharing the presupposition of a causal nexus between sin and suffering, are distinct from one another; that every speech exhibits coherence, and that each set of speeches delivered by each friend maintains the same position throughout the course of the dialogue; and that the detection and display both of coherence and distinctiveness are materially assisted by the recognition of certain rhetorical features characteristic of such speeches.
A Þnal implication of the present study is that the author of Job does not portray any development in the position, theology or argument of Job's friends: their minds are set in familiar patterns. By contrast-though this must be the subject of another paper-Job's mind is confused, þexible, experimental, and his argument constantly in course of development. Even in their style of argumentation, the friends provide a static stylized background against which the tortured but adventurous hero of the book excites our imagination and sympathy.
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